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Abstract 
Unlike their luckier neighbors to the west, Ukraine and Moldova did not enjoy a 
convenient geographical location, a national consensus, a clear identity or the state 
traditions to make their transition effective after the meltdown of the Soviet empire. Their 
initial transformation was gradual, with leaders at the helm inherited from the communist 
past. Thus began an evolution, in many ways similar to that of many other CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, that led to an oligarchic but pluralistic 
Ukrainian and a captured oligarchic Moldovan state. So far, reform efforts have not been 
successful, demonstrating the strength of the new systems that came into being. In 
Ukraine two revolutions aimed at radical reforms but the first one failed and so far the 
second did not deliver the kind of liberal state that demonstrators and Western partners 
expected alike. The case of Moldova is similar but here mistakes of the Western partners 
also contributed to the current, unreformed outcome. Increasingly, the issue centers 
around the rule-of-law, the establishment of a competent and independent judiciary – in 
a geopolitical space that could not be further away from what Luttwak 26 years ago 
imagined with his description of a transition to geoeconomics. In large parts of the world, 
including Eastern Europe, bad old traditional geopolitics is very much alive and shapes 
everyday life in the most dramatic way. 
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Introduction 
Both, Ukraine and Moldova have fallen in the last couple of years into deep governance-
induced political crisis. In both countries, the governing elite is continuing to govern in 
1 Kálmán Mizsei was founding head of the European Union’s advisory mission in Ukraine in 2014-15. 
From 2007 to 2011 he was Special Representative of the EU in Moldova. Between 2001 and 2006 he was 
a Regional Director of the United Nations Development Programme as UN Deputy Secretary-General. He 
is currently working on a book on Ukraine and Moldova with a research scholarship at the Central European 
University, supported by the Open Society Foundation. The present article is the result of the latter research. 
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the old, “oligarchic” way (the article will later on explain what this means) while there 
have been mass popular movements to change this. The inability to change the system of 
governance, in spite of mass protests and, in the case of Ukraine, two revolutions, risks 
the kind of popular disappointment with the “Western project” of the liberal democratic 
state that Russian President Putin has been trying to exploit elsewhere as well. This may 
bring these countries back under Russian tutelage, essentially undercutting their state 
sovereignty. In both countries Russia uses Russians as well as Russian speakers, along 
with conflicts, frozen and open, as blackmailing tools to pull these countries back under 
the kind of Russian influence that leaves but token sovereignty. Putin has so far not been 
particularly successful but neither has the West achieved much in terms of helping them 
to strengthen their respective states to a “point of no return.” The two countries so far 
have been struggling from crisis to crisis and as a result they are Europe’s poorest nations, 
lagging behind even the likes of Albania and Kosovo.  (See Figure 1 related to this.)  
  
 
Figure 1: Real GDP growth in various CEE (Central and Eatern European) 
countries, 1991-2013. Source: Dave Dalton, economist, at 
https://twitter.com/davedalton42/status/525913880216608768. 
 
Ukraine and Moldova have not yet made an irreversible turn towards liberal democracy 
and a free market economy, but neither are they autocracies, let alone fully statist 
economies. The struggle for transition, for reform, continues and so does the struggle over 
the geopolitical self-definition of these two countries. 
This short article sketches the evolution of these two neighbors, aspiring to full 
European integration, towards oligarchic politics and recurring crises.  
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The most useful framework of analysis for our purposes here may be that provided 
by Kuzio (2000) who observed that many of the post-socialist countries have embarked 
not only on a double transition from socialism into democracy and a market economy but 
also into nation-building and state-building. In fact, out of the 31 countries that were born 
on the ruins of the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Yugoslavia, only 5 continue to exist 
with unchanged state borders. He terms this process a “quadruple transition.” Rightly, he 
observes that this is a historically unprecedented, difficult challenge. 
 
What nation?2   
In both countries, in Ukraine and Moldova, even the idea of the nation is essentially 
contested.  In the case of Moldova, in the Soviet times the official propaganda had it that 
there was a Moldovan ethnic nation (King 2002), separate from Romanians. They also 
codified the Moldovan language as separate from Romanian although the way this took 
place, in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist times, it rendered the two literary languages 
indistinguishable from each other except for the fact that in the Soviet Union they used 
Cyrillic letters.3 Paradoxically, significant parts of the “Moldovan” intelligentsia that was 
educated on the basis of the Soviet ideology of the voluntary union of sovereign nations 
turned against this ideology and was able to articulate a credibly different political 
approach: the unity of the Moldovan and Romanian nations, starting from the latter part 
of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost.   
Why, then, did Moldova not simply join Romania after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union?  In the period of 1989-1991, in a way not dissimilar to Ukraine, a 
coincidence of interests emerged among important social groups: As I wrote above, a 
significant part of the local intelligentsia turned against the Soviet ideology that had 
intended to erect a wall between the Soviet “Moldovan” nation and the Romanians.  They 
found allies in the period of the acute crisis of the Soviet system in elements of the ruling 
elite, particularly those that were relatively underprivileged: the party and agricultural 
kolkhoz cadres of the “right bank” of the Nistru (Dniestr) river.   
However, while the unionist idea was very eye-catching and loud on the streets of 
Chisinau in 1990 and 1991, it turned out during the subsequent elections that its 
representatives did not at all enjoy the overwhelming support of the population. Ever 
since, it is impossible to gain more than 10-20 per cent of the votes on a unionist platform.  
                                                          
2 The sources of this section are King, 2000; Wilson, 2009; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994. 
3 On langauge and identity politics in Moldova see also Socor, 2014. 
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The paradox that the Soviet period saw the growth of a national intelligentsia 
exists in both countries. However, whereas in Ukraine it was a Ukrainian intelligentsia, 
in Moldova the “Moldovanist” ideology was identified with the Soviet Union, and it thus 
came to be discredited in the eyes of many (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 97). On the other 
hand, “Ukrainian” meant quite different things to different parts of the country. In what 
in Ukraine is called “Galicia” (or indeed Eastern Galicia) a strong ethnic Ukrainian 
national identity is accompanied with the Greek Catholic religion, distinct from the 
Russian Orthodox Church (and also from Catholicism further West, as the Greek 
Catholics pledge allegiance to Rome but maintain an orthodox ritual). In the central parts 
of Ukraine the Ukrainian identity is more fluid, stretching from traditional village 
Ukrainianness to a large town identity shaped in the Soviet past. While in the West the 
Ukrainian language is nearly universal, in central Ukraine’s large towns Ukrainian 
identity may well be accompanied with the dominance of the Russian language, and in 
villages with the use of “surzhik:” a regionally changing combination of Russian and 
Ukrainian.   
 
 
Figure 2: Ukraine’s historical regions. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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In general there is a very significant difference between the way World War 2 is 
interpreted through the filter of the “Soviet-rooted” Ukrainian identity and the more 
ethnic type, primarily in Galicia. Until very recently an almost religious version of a 
“heroic Soviet” identity prevailed in most parts of the country that were parts of the Soviet 
Union by the outbreak of the war. On the other hand, in the three West Ukrainian counties 
the ethnic version of the Ukrainian consciousness kept alive the mythology about the 
fiercely nationalistic Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and its political predecessor, the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).  Since the OUN and UPA had extremist 
and fascistic elements, the two narratives, while both distortive, have been highly 
conflicting. Reconciling the two Ukrainian patriotic narratives is a true challenge not 
particularly eased by the large Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the US that 
predominantly come from a very ethno-nationalistic West Ukrainian background. 
 
Elite continuity in the early period of independence 
In marked contrast to Estonia and Latvia (less so but still, to Lithuania)4, early elections 
left the Communist elites largely intact and in dominant position in the economy and in 
important state functions in both countries. 
This is, then, the identity background of the state and economy-building that 
started in the two countries in 1991-2, as the Soviet Union unexpectedly melted away.  
This had major and lasting impact on what kind of state and economy they built from the 
local ruins of the Soviet Union. And ruins they were, as the old Soviet integration patterns 
evaporated together with the Soviet Union.  Much of the Soviet industry was rendered 
uncompetitive on the world markets while within the former Soviet Union simultaneous 
collapse and a shrinking economy reduced demand for each other’s products.  These 
countries were also less lucky geographically than most of the former Central-East 
European satellites of the Soviet Union. For Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, while 
it was not easy, it was more feasible to find Western markets to replace earlier Soviet 
demand than for Moldova and Ukraine, that were geographically much more isolated 
from them. Thus the challenge of economic reform was certainly more momentous.  
                                                          
4 See Lieven (1993) concerning the Baltics. 
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These post-communist elites also lacked the kind of understanding of the 
“Western” alternative economic models that their colleagues in Central Europe already 
understood much better.5  
While in the Central European and the Baltic countries (with the exception until 
1998 of Slovakia) there was a determined move towards an economic and social system 
compatible with that of the European countries, on the basis of the consensus wish to 
become integrated in both the EU and NATO, this consensus as well as the reforms 
towards the Western model were absent in Ukraine and largely absent also in Moldova. 
One also needs to understand that the EU and NATO became interested in these formerly 
Soviet republics only gradually. The Moldovan elite was somewhat more inclined to 
follow the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF), and other Western partners’, advise in 
the 1990s, but this opportunity was not particularly well used – partly because the Western 
partners did not have a detailed enough intellectual answer to Moldova’s problems. The 
country was wedged between two slow reformers and poor markets – Romania and 
Ukraine. The country needed an enormous degree of radicalism if it wanted to reap the 
fruits of reforms. Its bureaucrat leaders neither had the will nor the ability to conduct such 
radical reforms. Thus the country moved slowly away from socialism but not towards the 
liberal, EU-compatible state that characterized Central Europe and the Baltics in the 
1990s.  The Moldova of the 1990s was not as “oligarchic” as Ukraine but neither was it 
successful. The economy declined throughout the whole decade. This situation inevitably 
led to the kind of nostalgia for the Soviet past that manifested itself in the overwhelming 
electoral victory of the re-established Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova 
(PCRM) in 2001. President Voronin’s powers were such, and his reign so long (8 years) 
that in the given structures it could only become what Hale calls a “single-pyramid 
patronal society.” 
 
The formation of the oligarchic system  
In Ukraine the current oligarchic pluralism took shape similarly gradually. The 
presidency of Kravchuk (1991-94) was short lived as Ukraine did not accomplish the kind 
                                                          
5 Of course it applies less to the comparison with the Baltics where a combination of factors helped. They 
purged, essentially, the Russian elites in the state apparatus and, particularly in reform-frontrunner Estonia, 
invited foreign experts of Baltic ethnic backgrounds to introduce market reforms. Their motivation for 
national reawakening and Western economic reforms worked fortiutously, while they also enjoyed the 
advantage of Nordic markets and a friendly approach towards their assistance. 
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of reforms that the Central European countries did during this time. While Moldova was 
in the shadow, it cannot be said about Ukraine.   
Kravchuk adequately addressed one of the four transition challenges: nation-
building.  He did it tactfully in order not to alienate the East of the country with a very 
different historical and identity narrative than the one prevalent in the West. That is his 
great historical contribution even if he started as the Ukrainian Soviet Communist Party 
ideology supremo. His credentials in democratic politics should not be assessed too 
negatively in light of what came after him. However, given his communist ideological 
background, capitalist market economic reform was a bridge too far.  And the economic 
situation so much deteriorated during his presidency, including damaging hyperinflation, 
that he could not avoid early elections. Should Ukraine at the time have had a Balcerowicz 
with adequate powers, we would, perhaps, not have the problem now of oligarchy and 
lost territories. 
With Kravchuk’s successor, Kuchma, the swings started between reform and 
oligarchic expansion. Kuchma, whose background was in the senior management of the 
military industry, had to first handle the economic crisis that Kravchuk left behind. He 
needed the IMF for this, and thus he pledged reforms.6 However, as soon as the country 
seemed off the hook, already in 1995, the reform-willingness dropped.7 In the pro-reform 
period macroeconomic consolidation and the successful introduction of the national 
currency were among the lasting results. 
In the first years of lawlessness criminality spread and played an active role in the 
original accumulation of capital. The main sources of capital accumulation at the time 
were “security” and “insurance” payments to gangs as well as the more “white collar” 
acquisitions of monopoly trading rights in the field of energy – particularly in the field of 
energy imports from Russia. Industry collapsed but the privatization that could have 
saved some of the industry did not take off until 2000, after Kuchma appointed 
Yushchenko as prime minister – in reaction to yet another crisis. 
The second short-lived reform period happened in both countries after the Russian 
financial crisis that dashed the nascent post-Soviet recovery hopes in 1998. In Moldova 
its lack of radicalism and comprehensiveness in reform led to massive dissatisfaction and 
elections in 2001 that brought eight years of rule by the communists. Voronin came to 
power in 2001 after a decade of disappointment and the lack of prospects – on the back 
                                                          
6 See particularly Aslund, 2009. 
7 See Aslund (2009: 86-87 and onward) for the description of this policy reversal. 
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of nostalgic sentiments towards the stability of the Soviet times. He promised re-
establishing kolkhozes, re-nationalizing factory assets, reuniting with Russia (and 
Belarus), reuniting also the Transnistrian region, and that he will pay pensions on time 
that, after the chaos of the 1990s, was a winning formula. None of this happened, 
however, except for the minimum stability of timely pension and salary payments. The 
country did not return to the Soviet times and even the reunification of Transnistria was 
aborted at the end of 2003. The nascent oligarchs of the previous period were replaced by 
Voronin’s own trusted politician-enterpreneurs.  It was a period of strong personal power 
by the former-Minister-of-Internal-Affairs-of-Soviet-Moldova-turned-President. This 
also entailed strong law-and-order and the subordination of the oligarchs as well as lower-
level political barons to the chief patron.8   
Voronin also had to change the ideology gradually, as back to the future was 
neither feasible nor desirable to him once he had the presidential power. He got gradually 
convinced that large scale renationalization would not produce the kind of prosperity he 
needed to keep power; it seemed superior to this to keep private control of assets by his 
favorites. In Putin’s Russia he did not find a fair partner to his geopolitical ideas. He 
wanted to reunite Transnistria by subordinating it to his reign. When in the fall of 2003 
he was willing to give major concessions to Russia, it ran aground due to the combined 
effects of the simultaneous Georgian Rose Revolution and massive nationalistic protests 
in Chisinau.9  The Communist Voronin then changed geopolitical course and turned 
European. However, he was unwilling to reform Moldova in the way that would be 
compatible with rapid European integration – which otherwise could have happened, 
given that from 2007 it had a major advocate in Brussels, once Romania joined the 
European Union. Voronin was profoundly “Moldovanist,” and he did not want 
subordination to Romania. Culturally, he was still closer to Russia. His European turn 
was half-hearted and his eventual reforms timid.   
Ukraine did not succeed, either, in getting out of the kind of oligarchic order that 
it gradually had slid into during the Kuchma years. After the 1998 crisis, in order to please 
the international donors, particularly the IMF, Kuchma nominated Viktor Yushchenko as 
prime minister who earlier was responsible, as the governor of the central bank, for the 
successful introduction of the national currency, the hryvnia, and for a similarly 
                                                          
8 A theoretical interpretation of patronal politics in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) space 
can be found Hale, 2015.  
9 For a very detailed descriptuon of this dramatic event see Hill, 2012. 
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successful anti-inflationary macroeconomic policy.  In 2000, Yushchenko introduced a 
new wave of reforms, including breaking those monopolies which had been responsible 
for the rapid enrichment of some of the new oligarchs. He also started privatization in the 
field of energy. This, for the first time since gaining independence, gave large productive 
assets into private hands.10 In this way another class of oligarchic power emerged but at 
least in the productive sectors, as opposed to the pure rent-seeking seen in the case of the 
earlier oligarchic formations.  He also opened up privatization to foreigners but in the 
prevailing circumstances of regulatory uncertainty practically only Russian investors 
capitalized on the opportunity, besides the domestic oligarchs. 
Still, the fact of introducing competition in the process, and the attempt to kill 
some of the local monopolies made Kuchma’s presidential team (a subset of oligarchs) 
unhappy and it was only a question of time that Kuchma replaced him with the man of 
the “Donbass clan”, Viktor Yanukovich.  It is characteristic of the birth of Ukrainian 
oligarchic capitalism that a man with a criminal history as a repeated offender could be 
put forward for this position. At this juncture, the biggest challenge for Kuchma became 
balancing between the different oligarchic interests. Unlike Putin in Russia (or on a much 
smaller scale Voronin in Moldova), he was not able to get the upper hand over the 
oligarchs. Thus his presidential nominee in 2004 was Yanukovich, in spite of his clear 
misgivings about the candidate.   
What was on the minds of the members of the “Donbass clan” was undoubtedly 
to nominate one of theirs but one who is not that so strong economically that he could 
grow above them. This consideration also played a role in the nomination of Putin in 
Russia where it spectacularly backfired. In Ukraine the nomination and the effort to 
manufacture the election results eventually failed and the Orange Revolution at the end 
of 2004 put in charge the two reformer leaders of the 2000 government.  Many observers, 
including the author of this study, thought that this was the moment for Ukraine to correct 
the earlier detour from transition and follow the path of the Central European and Baltic 
reformers. It turned out that this was not to happen. 
Given that in all the CIS countries, with the exception of Georgia,11 a kind of 
patronal or mafia state has prevailed over the last quarter of a century, it is a legitimate 
                                                          
10 For a good description see Aslund (2009: 133-143). 
11 At the time of its Rose Revolution and the ensuing reforms, Georgia was still a member of the CIS. On 
the Georgian reforms see Burakova, 2011. 
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question to ask if the failure of the Yushchenko–Tymoshenko team was a structural 
inevitability, or if there really was a different path to take? 
 
Why so hard to reform? 
Georgia’s example indicates that the kind of patronal state that worked in Ukraine as well 
as in Georgia can be reformed.  Moreover, the Georgian reforms happened in front of the 
Ukrainians since the Ukrainian revolution followed the one in Georgia a year later. Also, 
the international community made available considerable expertise to support reforms.12 
Thus, there was an opportunity to overcome the inertia of oligarchic politics.  The fact 
that this did not happen is due to several factors. First, the incoming Prime Minister, Yulia 
Tymoshenko, was the kind of populist who did not believe that liberalizing reforms can 
be popular. While she initiated a transparent re-run on the privatization of the giant steel 
combine Kryvorizhstal, she also applied the kind of anti-market populism, e.g. in price 
controls, that the Saakashvili government never contemplated, let alone implemented.  
Second, the President played a laid-back role at first, and only then tried to undermine his 
inadequate but politically very skillful Prime Minister. This fatally weakened the 
reformist coalition and gave a new breath of life to the Donbass team, with, incredibly, 
the discredited Yanukovich at its helm. In Georgia, leadership was crucial to the 
breakthrough reforms while it was totally absent, surprisingly and disappointingly, in 
Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. Third, in Georgia there was an adequate 
combination of ideologies for a breakthrough reform: Saakashvili addressed corruption 
with a genuine determination. He combined this with a libertarian approach to the state 
that in the circumstances was adequate as it is much easier to fight corruption in a reduced, 
deregulated state than in a large, redistributive one that Ukraine had been – and remained, 
under Tymoshenko’s populist drive. Forth, Ukraine is a large country with a much larger 
and more powerful oligarchic class than Georgia’s, and also more important for Russia. 
Thus the system’s inertial force is stronger than in Georgia. Nevertheless, if similar 
determination and reformist intelligence would have been in place, Ukraine could have 
turned the corner. However it did not, and the split post-revolution camp gave a renewed 
chance to Yanukovich and his Donbass-gang to regain power.   
                                                          
12 The author at the time was UNDP’s Regional Director for Europe and the CIS and in this capacity he 
asembled an expert group, styled on the Hungarian Blue Ribbon Commission with identical name and 
issued its „Proposals to the Preisdent: A New Wave of Reform” (Blue Ribbon Commission. UNDP, 2004). 
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Yanukovych won the presidential elections with a small majority in 2010 but 
immediately acted to narrow the democratic space by violating the constitution as well as 
by putting his competitors (and sometimes his political partners) in prison. Geopolitics 
played an important role. Since the European idea was popular, and he understood the 
disadvantages of being dependent on Putin, he continued to pursue negotiations for an 
Association Agreement with the EU. Some reforms he was able to put into legislation and 
in rare cases he even implemented them better than his chaotic and internally divided 
predecessors. However, in the last minute, he found the Russian offer of a 15-billion 
(USD) loan more attractive than association with the European Union, with all the rule-
of-law strings attached. Even though his successors did not investigate the abuses of 
power during the Yanukovich era, nor those during the Euromaidan uprising, the victory 
of the protestors opened the windows to look into the governing style and methods of 
Yanukovich.   
Before turning to the post-Yanukovich era, we need to see what happened in 
Moldova. The outcome of the systemic evolution of Moldova was very similar even 
though it could have been very different. While Ukraine, through the disjoint among its 
reformist-pro-European politicians, elevated Yanukovich to the presidency in 2010, in 
Moldova seemingly the opposite happened: the forces with the “pro-European” banner 
won in the October 2009 repeat elections. The clear expectation was that this would speed 
up reforms towards Europe. In actuality, the process was full of paradoxes. It is legitimate 
to call the communists not-pro-European since their domestic policies were almost as 
ambiguous as those of Yanukovich. They were bargaining intensely for an Association 
Agreement and particularly for two freedoms: a visa-free travel regime in Europe and a 
free trade agreement. On the other hand, Voronin’s policies favored economic 
monopolies, his oligarchs were stifling foreign investment, and the judiciary was certainly 
not independent. He was lucky insofar as his reign coincided with the generally strong 
growth period of the whole CIS area – it was also the period of the guest-worker exodus 
from Moldova (and elsewhere) that improved the foreign incomes of the state 
dramatically through very strong growth in remittances. The dissatisfaction with his reign 
that manifested on April 7, 2009, two days after the election that the communists won, 
was not primarily of economic origin but had its roots in constrained freedoms.   
Unlike in Ukraine, in Moldova the European Union had a very large, at the time 
almost infinite leverage.  It is a small country and its EU neighbor, Romania, pays special 
attention to it. Yet, this leverage was not used adequately – in fact it was wasted.  The 
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fundamental problem with the EU’s approach was that it did not apply strict expectations, 
or conditionalities. The emerging coalition used the EU banner but it also misused it. The 
first test of the application of the rule-of-law was the election of the president. The 
Moldovan constitution prescribes that the Parliament choose the President with a 61 per 
cent majority. In 2009 and 2010 the governing coalition did not have this majority. Instead 
of what this rule implies – a consensus-seeking process – the then-temporary President 
Ghimpu chose an the unconstitutional road. At this moment both the European Union and 
the Council of Europe looked the other way, endorsing the violation of the rules in the 
name of keeping the communists out of power. 
This triggered a slippery slope whereby the ruling coalition pretended that it did 
the “right things” while the EU tried to convince the member states that Moldova 
“deserved” the associate status, along with free trade and visa free travel. The confusion 
was multiple: first, it is wrong that visa free travel for citizens should depend to such an 
extent on the rulers’ behavior when it is in fact a reward for citizens. Second, conditions 
in Moldova did not deteriorate all of a sudden in 2013 – instead, in the previous period, a 
lax conditionality regime of the EU (and to some extent the US) allowed the systemic 
evolution of the country to degenerate.  A disciplined approach from the EU would have 
resulted in better systemic evolution in Moldova.   
The country from 2013 gradually slipped into wavering between a failing and a 
captured state. In 2013 a covered-up fatal hunting accident triggered a show-down 
between the Prime Minister Filat – seemingly rising into dominance in the country – and 
the richest oligarch, Plahotniuc.13 Plahotniuc’s career is very important here: he grew into 
a strong business position under Voronin as a partner of the President’s son but jumped 
ship with perfect timing in 2009.  He essentially bought up the Democratic Party with the 
then-heavyweight Marian Lupu whom he gradually subordinated. Behind the scenes, he 
gained power with a combination of bribes and blackmail: via collecting compromat. In 
this way he gradually took control of the power institutions of the country, particularly a 
large chunk of the security services as well as, critically, the prosecution service.  In the 
duel between the two strongmen of the country surprisingly Plahotniuc gained the upper 
hand, and this culminated in Filat’s taking into custody in October 2015, and his 
sentencing to nine years recently.   
                                                          
13 See Mizsei (2013) on this.  
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The European Union has gradually tightened its approach towards the country that 
in 2013 was still regarded in Brussels as the top performer among the Eastern Partnership 
countries.  It has also strengthened the growing social dissatisfaction with the cleptocratic 
elite that got accentuated by the “fraud of the century:” a banking theft that left a hole in 
the banking sector equivalent to 12 per cent of the country’s GDP, a kind of world 
record.14 However, the resourcefulness of Plahotniuc is illustrated by the way he managed 
to release the valve from the growing balloon of social protest. In May 2016 the 
Constitutional Court, with a convoluted argument, invalidated the decision of its 
predecessors 16 years ago that established the rules of voting for the president. Thus, 
instead of parliamentary elections, a presidential election will follow in October 2016 – 
giving more opportunities for the powerful but intensely unpopular Mr. Plahotniuc to 
manipulate the scene.  
Moldova still declares its allegiance to Europe. However, its leaders and society 
will have to play out if the country is going to move towards establishing the rule-of-law. 
In the opposite case, its conflict with the EU over the absence of serious reforms may 
push the country towards Russia over time.   
While Moldova sunk gradually into lawlessness, in Ukraine Yanukovich’ rule 
ended with the Revolution of Dignity in November 2014.  As a response to the victory of 
the pro-democracy and pro-Europe popular uprising, Russia aggressed on the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine and occupied the Crimea and, combined with local separatists and 
simple criminals, large chunks of the two Donbass regions, Donetsk and Luhansk.  
Ukraine needed to reform in those extremely difficult circumstances. However, not only 
the external threat proved to be difficult to face but also the forceful logic of the oligarchic 
system. A presidential election, the competitive character of the coalition government, 
and a parliamentary and local election within one-and-a-half years gave plenty of 
opportunity to the oligarchs in this very expensive political system to insert their interests 
throughout the political process, and to undermine the ethos of deep, thorough systemic 
reform. The international analysts and official local reformers have created plenty of 
reform scorecards but these scorecards do not reflect on the fact that in some critical areas 
                                                          
14 A very good political analysis of the bank fraud is available at 
https://moldovanpolitics.com/2016/05/19/anti-corruption-policy-failure-the-case-of-moldovas-billion-
dollar-scandal/. See also: http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/08/eastern-europe.  
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there has not yet been any breakthrough.15 The situation is somewhat reminiscent of 2004. 
The comparison with the Georgian reforms still holds: while the Georgian reformers 
targeted corruption as the main enemy of the country in 2004, this was only pretended in 
Ukraine from 2014. However, there was a very big difference in the approach of the 
Western partners this time, and Ukraine was heavily dependent on them. Demands by the 
IMF, the US as well as the European Union were more concrete and assertive regarding 
the “fight against corruption,” with the recognition that corruption in Ukraine is systemic, 
with a view to the independence of the judiciary and rent-seeking in the energy sector. As 
to the latter, some notable successes have been achieved and indeed the budgetary 
subsidization of the oligarchs seriously decreased. In the other two areas, however, there 
has not yet been any noticeable breakthrough. In a situation of a lack of energetic reform 
leadership – and Ukraine after 2014 certainly qualifies in this respect – it is inherently 
difficult for foreigners to apply conditionality effectively. There is always plenty of tricks 
that can be applied to duck conditionalities.  
The two revolutions, in 2004 and in 2014, created a large civil society that has a 
wide range of activities. Part of this civil society is a set of think tanks who are very 
instrumental in articulating reform expectations. Thus there is a coalition between reform-
minded MPs and politicians, civil society and Western partners of Ukraine. Whereas the 
reforms so far are disappointing and way behind the expectations of the Euromaidan in 
2014, it would be too early to write off the developments of the last two years as yet 
another failed revolution. Among the positive systemic developments one can list the 
reduction of rent-seeking possibilities, the partial cleaning up of the banking sector, initial 
steps towards police reform, and some inconclusive but initial steps on the way towards 
judicial autonomy. There are tentative signs that the National Anti-Corruption bureau, 
together with the general prosecutor’s office, may be taking up some of the large 
corruption cases. While it would be very naïve to believe that the choice of cases and their 
timing is free of politics – on the contrary, they are purely political – some highly visible 
cases could become deterrents for further corruption and can also deliver a certain feel-
good factor to the population that has become very apathic towards politics overall.  
 
                                                          
15 See also http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/02/04/a-year-of-reforms-in-ukraine-the-best-the-worst-and-
why-they-are-so-slow/#arvlbdata and http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/19/ukraine-reform-monitor-
february-2016-pub-62831.  
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Summary 
Both Ukraine and Moldova have lived for a very long time in the double ambivalence of 
reform vs. oligarchy, and West vs. East.  The two are deeply interconnected: a regime 
that is not democratic and does not reduce systemic corruption cannot be attractive to the 
European Union, while a clean government will not chose Russia as its long-term 
geopolitical ally. On the other hand, what is best for Putin’s Russia to deal with is a 
corrupt mafia state where it can make the chief patron of the state its ally. Even though 
any head of state would see Putin’ alliance a discomforting one, without the prospect of 
European integration their room for manoeuvre will inevitably be reduced, as November 
2014 illustrated. In certain circumstances deeply corrupted and increasingly illegitimate 
leaders may still choose the Russia option as the lesser presumed immediate evil. Thus, 
in the case of the two neighboring countries there has been a dynamic balance between 
the two geopolitical forces.  
In the case of Moldova, after 2009 the EU had the leverage to seal a long-term 
geopolitical alliance through systemic reforms. Neither the technical know-how nor the 
political skills were present in the EU for this, however. 
From 2014 the EU has been, together with the US, better allies in change in 
Ukraine as well as in Moldova. Now, however, the overall international circumstances 
make exerting this influence more difficult for a much weakened Western alliance. Still, 
with the right skills and determination, this battle can be won – also for the benefit of a 
more stable and peaceful international order. Particularly Ukraine’s future trajectory will 
have a critical influence over the international order. 
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